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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HEARSAY EVIDENCE
IN NEW YORK STATE SEX OFFENDER CIVIL
COMMITMENT HEARINGS AFTER
STATE V. FLOYD Y.: FINDING A BALANCE
BETWEEN PROMOTING THE GENERAL
WELFARE OF SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS
AND PROVIDING DUE PROCESS OF LAW
Brittany K. Dryer*
In twenty states throughout the country, the government may petition for
the civil commitment of detained sex offenders after they are released from
prison. Although processes differ among the states, the government must
generally show at a court proceeding that a detained sex offender both
suffers from a mental abnormality and is dangerous and that this
combination makes a detained sex offender likely to reoffend. At such court
proceedings, both the government and the respondent will present evidence
to either the court or the jury on these issues. As in most court proceedings,
hearsay evidence is inadmissible at sex offender civil commitment hearings
unless it meets sufficient indicia of reliability or fits within an established
exception to the general rule against hearsay.
On November 19, 2013, the New York State Court of Appeals determined
that in sex offender civil commitment hearings, the best way to show that
hearsay evidence regarding uncharged crimes and/or dropped charges
meets sufficient indicia of reliability is to require live confrontation of the
declarant. This Note argues, however, that neither the U.S. Constitution
nor New York State’s Civil Practice Law and Rules require live
confrontation. In addition, live confrontation conflicts with the legislative
intent of New York State’s sex offender civil commitment statute and is
detrimental to the psychological well-being of victims of sexual assault.
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INTRODUCTION
The year is 1998: a man named Floyd is sexually abusing Jane Smith’s1
eight-year-old daughter Mary and fifteen-year-old daughter Sarah.2 Either
because of denial or a lack of knowledge, Jane is unaware that Floyd has an
extensive criminal history of sexual abuse. Only six years before, Floyd
was convicted of sexual abuse for raping a twenty-three-year-old female
neighbor.3 Two years later, Floyd was accused of sexually abusing a
fifteen-year-old girl. One year after that, Floyd pled guilty to harassing the
girl’s twin sister after inappropriately touching her while she was staying at
Floyd’s home. Floyd’s rap sheet does not stop there.4 Only two years later,
Floyd was accused of sexually abusing an eight-year-old family friend and
admitted to having inappropriate telephone conversations with his
seventeen-year-old sister-in-law.5
One day in 1998, the abuse came to a screeching halt when Jane walked
in on Floyd lying on top of Sarah, attempting to play a “tickle game” with
her.6 Although there was enough evidence to bring charges against
Floyd—and charges were in fact brought—they were eventually dropped.7
To spare Sarah the trauma of testifying at trial, Jane agreed that if Floyd
signed a parole document agreeing to stay away from Sarah, she would
drop the charges. Jane immediately broke up with Floyd, and soon
thereafter, Mary accused Floyd of sexual abuse. The district attorney,
however, determined that there was insufficient evidence and corroboration
for these accusations, and no charges were brought against Floyd.8
Fast forward to the year 2007: Floyd has since been convicted of
sexually abusing his nine-year-old stepson and eight-year-old stepdaughter
from another relationship and served four years in prison.9 Then, the
telephone rings: it is the Attorney General’s Office.10 One of the assistant
attorney generals asks to speak with Mary, who is now seventeen years
old.11 The assistant attorney general reluctantly explains that Floyd had
finally been convicted of sexual abuse of yet two more youths and is
1. All names in this Introduction are fictitious as to maintain anonymity and are only
used for clarity.
2. See State v. Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d 204, 207 (N.Y. 2013).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See State v. Floyd Y., 953 N.Y.S.2d 566, 570 (App. Div. 2012), rev’d, 2 N.E.3d 204.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d at 205–07.
10. The Attorney General’s Office represents the state in cases pertaining to sex
offenders requiring civil commitment or supervision. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.03
(McKinney 2011). Unlike in criminal proceedings, where the District Attorney represents
the “people,” the Attorney General represents the “state” in these cases. Id.
11. The assistant attorney general does not need to speak with Sarah because the
agreement Floyd Y. signed to stay away from her was sufficient substantiating evidence. See
infra notes 302–03 and accompanying text.
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nearing his release date from prison. The only way to ensure he is not
released is for the state to file a petition for civil commitment, and the only
way the state will have enough evidence to show that Floyd requires civil
commitment is for Mary to testify in open court—in front of her abuser—
about what happened to her as a child nine years earlier.
The assistant attorney general does not make this call lightly. In most
cases, a sex offender’s prior victims play no role in sex offender civil
commitment proceedings.12 Because the district attorney did not have
enough evidence to corroborate Mary’s accusations in 1998, however, the
assistant attorney general needs the victim to come in and testify. If she
does not, then the state cannot introduce her accusations against Floyd at
the civil commitment proceedings, and it will be as if the abuse never
happened.
The scenario presented is drawn from the New York State Court of
Appeals case, State v. Floyd Y.,13 in which the court held that, without
substantiating evidence, the introduction of statements about uncharged
crimes and dropped charges would violate due process.14 Consequently,
the court held that the most credible way to ensure due process is to
establish the statements’ reliability by requiring the declarant to testify in
open court about the events that occurred.15
The civil commitment of a U.S. citizen is extremely serious. It deprives
citizens of one of their most basic rights: liberty.16 Further, because most
sex offender civil commitment statutes do not prescribe a term of years for
civil commitment, sex offenders found to require civil commitment may be
deprived of their liberty indefinitely.17
Further, some commentators argue that civil commitment statutes violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution, which states, “nor shall any
person be subject for the same offen[s]e to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb.”18 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the civil
commitment of sex offenders does not violate the Fifth Amendment in any
respect,19 the debate about the constitutionality of civil commitment statutes
survives today.20
Although the civil commitment of a U.S. citizen is of great consequence,
the psychological well-being of victims of sexual assault is also gravely
important. Sex offender civil commitment laws are not intended to apply to
12. See infra Part II.B.3.
13. 2 N.E.3d 204 (N.Y. 2013).
14. See id. at 205.
15. Id. at 214.
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
17. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.09 (McKinney 2011) (explaining that sex
offenders civilly committed under Article § 10 have the right to annual examinations for
discharge; however, if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent
is still a dangerous sex offender requiring confinement, confinement will continue until the
respondent’s next examination).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 371 (1997).
20. See Kevin G. Vanginderen, Kansas v. Hendricks: Throwing Away the Key, 20 T.
JEFFERSON L. REV. 357, 371–75 (1998).
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all sex offenders, but rather to only the most violent, dangerous, and
recidivist ones.21 While this ensures that only the “worst of the worst” will
be considered for civil commitment, it may have severe implications for the
well-being of victims.
For example, numerous psychological studies conclude that victims of
sexual assault who testify in court may suffer irreparable harm such as
stunted development, depression, anxiety, and uncontrollable fear.22 This is
because testifying in front of one’s abuser may reexpose a victim to feelings
of betrayal, helplessness, and powerlessness.23 Furthermore, both state
legislatures and courts have recognized the same sentiment.24 Around the
country, both state and federal courts implement alternatives that either
reduce or eliminate the need for live confrontation, while still ensuring the
accused due process.25
Nonetheless, the New York State Court of Appeals suggests that in sex
offender civil commitment hearings, which often take place decades after
victims have been sexually abused, the most reliable way to ensure due
process is to require live confrontation.26 While on the surface this solution
may seem reasonable, this Note argues that there are various alternatives
that satisfy due process without unnecessarily involving the live testimony
of past victims of sexual assault.
Part I of this Note explores the history of civil commitment in the United
States, the laws that govern civil commitment statutes, and New York
State’s Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act. Part II presents the
events leading up to the holding in State v. Floyd Y. as well as how the
decision relates to the laws governing civil commitment statutes. Part III
examines the psychological impacts live confrontation may have on victims
of sexual assault, and Part IV concludes that live confrontation can be, and
should be, the last resort to substantiate hearsay evidence in sex offender
civil commitment proceedings.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF SEX OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES, THE GOVERNING RULES, AND NEW YORK STATE’S SEX
OFFENDER MANAGEMENT AND TREATMENT ACT
Part I first explores the history of civil commitment law in the United
States. This part then presents the laws governing civil commitment
statutes and concludes with an examination of New York State’s Sex
Offender Management and Treatment Act.

21. See S. 3318, 230th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 59–63 (N.Y. 2007) (stating that “those
referred for civil commitment should be repeat, chronic felony sex offenders who have
committed predatory crimes involving violence, stranger victims or young children”).
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. See infra Part II.B.
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See State v. Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d 204, 214 (N.Y. 2013).
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A. The History of Civil Commitment Law in the United States
Part I.A first explores how the civil commitment of the mentally ill came
to fruition in the United States. It then explores the history of civil
commitment, focusing on the civil commitment of sex offenders in the
United States in general and New York State specifically.
1. The Origins of Civil Commitment Law
In order to understand how and why states began to civilly commit
dangerous sex offenders suffering from mental abnormalities, it is useful to
acknowledge the justifications and origins of civil commitment of the
mentally ill generally.
There are two main justifications state governments cite in implementing
their power to civilly commit the mentally ill.27 First, state governments
cite the doctrine of parens patriae.28 Parens patriae is a Latin phrase that
translates to “parent of the country.”29 The idea behind parens patriae is
that the government has the responsibility to act in the best interest of its
citizens when such citizens cannot do so for themselves.30 The second, and
perhaps stronger, justification for civil commitment is rooted in the states’
police powers. The states’ police powers are derived from the Tenth
Amendment, which states that all powers not delegated to the federal
government are reserved to the states.31 It follows from the Tenth
Amendment that states therefore have the power to promote the health,
safety, morals, and general welfare of their citizens, including enacting
statutes that may impede on the liberty of some citizens.32
The origins of civil commitment in the United States date back to
fifteenth-century London.33 In 1403, London’s Bedlam Hospital opened
the first inpatient asylum dedicated to individuals suffering from mental
illnesses.34 Some centuries later, the first inpatient asylum emerged in the
United States.35
Before the development of inpatient asylums in the United States,
however, individuals suffering from mental illnesses were often confined to

27. See Megan Testa & Sara G. West, Civil Commitment in the United States, 7
PSYCHIATRY 30, 31 (2010).
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
32. See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 457 (1827).
33. See Testa & West, supra note 27, at 31–32.
34. See id. The National Alliance on Mental Illness defines a mental illness as “a
condition that impacts a person’s thinking, feeling or mood [and] may affect . . . his or her
ability to relate to others and function on a daily basis.” Nat’l All. on Mental Illness, What Is
Mental Illness?, MENTAL ILLNESSES, http://www.nami.org/Template.cfm?Section=By_
Illness (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/8C48-583L].
35. See Testa & West, supra note 27, at 32; see also Stuart A. Anfang & Paul S.
Appelbaum, Civil Commitment—The American Experience, 43 ISR. J. PSYCHIATRY &
RELATED SCI. 209, 210 (2006) (noting that the first psychiatric admission to occur in the
colonies was in 1752 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania).
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prisons and homeless shelters.36 While in these settings, mentally ill
patients rarely received treatment and were subject to dangerous and
unhealthy living conditions.37 Further, the legal standard for civil
commitment during this time was exceptionally archaic because there were
no procedural safeguards in place to determine whether an individual
actually required treatment.38 For example, in 1860, a clergyman confined
his wife to an asylum for having an “unclean spirit,” as she was interested
in exploring religious traditions outside the Presbyterian Church.39
Nonetheless, by the nineteenth century, the first inpatient asylums were
established in the United States.40 For example, between 1817 and 1824,
Connecticut, New York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania opened four
privately funded asylums.41 Soon thereafter, many southern states opened
public asylums, and the presence of state-run mental hospitals began to
increase.42
Along with an increase in the existence of asylums in the twentieth
century came an increase in due process rights for the mentally ill.43 For
example, numerous states implemented new legal safeguards, including the
right to counsel and the right to be heard.44 In addition, the power to civilly
commit an individual was removed from psychiatric professionals and
given to judges and magistrates.45
Although the implementation of legal safeguards had an impact, it was
not until the 1960s that states began to establish rigid legal requirements for
the civil commitment of the mentally ill.46 The most famous case regarding
such requirements, O’Connor v. Donaldson,47 was decided in 1975. The
U.S. Supreme Court held that an individual could not be civilly committed
based solely on a psychiatric professional’s finding that an individual
suffers from a mental illness.48 The Court explained that there was no
constitutional foundation for civilly committing a mentally ill individual
who is not dangerous and can live safely on his or her own.49
The Court in O’Connor ruled that in order for an individual to be
involuntarily hospitalized against his or her will, it must be shown that (1)
the individual suffers from a mental illness and (2) the individual poses a
36. See Testa & West, supra note 27, at 32; see also Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note
35, at 209.
37. See Testa & West, supra note 27, at 32.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 33; see also Philip Fennel & Robert Lloyd Goldstein, The Application of
Civil Commitment Law and Practices to a Case of Delusional Disorder: A Cross-National
Comparison of Legal Approaches in the United States and the United Kingdom, 24 BEHAV.
SCI. & L. 385, 386–87 (2006).
47. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
48. See id. at 575.
49. See id.
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danger to himself or others.50 The burden of proof for these criteria varies
among the states; however, the Court ruled that requiring proof by “clear,
unequivocal and convincing evidence” is constitutionally sound.51
2. The Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders
Throughout the twentieth century, the government became increasingly
involved in the regulation of the civil commitment of the mentally ill.52 As
a result of this increased regulation, the government learned more about the
mentally ill and the different populations that suffer from mental illness.53
One specific subset of the mentally ill—sex offenders—stood out to the
government, as they “f[e]ll at the intersection between psychiatry and law”
and posed a unique problem to society.54
The earliest statutes calling for the civil commitment of sex offenders
date back to the 1930s, when there was a surge in research on whether
criminal conduct could be explained by medical conditions.55 These
statutes, however, were ultimately unsuccessful as they were overbroad and
deprived the accused of basic individual liberties, such as the “right to a
trial, with attorney representation, prior to psychiatric admission.”56
A few decades later, in the 1960s, twenty-six states and the District of
Columbia passed statutes permitting the civil commitment of an individual
found to be a “sexual psychopath.”57 These statutes, however, called for
civil commitment as an alternative to criminal sentences, not as a postrelease condition.58
As a result of these statutes, new research emerged regarding sex
offenders’ responses to treatment.59 By 1970, because a substantial amount
of this research showed that sex offenders were not responding to the

50. See id.
51. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979).
52. See Anfang & Appelbaum, supra note 35, at 210–12; Fennel & Lloyd, supra note
46, at 386–88; Testa & West, supra note 27, at 32–34.
53. See Testa & West, supra note 27, at 35.
54. Id. The U.S. government defines a sex offender as “an individual who was
convicted of a sex offense.” 42 U.S.C. § 16911 (2012). The term “sex offense” is defined
broadly, including “a criminal offense that has an element involving a sexual act or sexual
contact with another” and “a criminal offense that is a specified offense against a minor.” Id.
The broadness of the definition of both “sex offender” and “sex offense” has caused
substantial controversy among legal scholars, which, however, is beyond the scope of this
Note. See Katherine Godin, The New Scarlet Letter: Are We Taking the Sex Offender Label
Too Far?, 60 R.I. B.J. 17, 19–20 (2011); see also Marion Buckley & J. Michael True, “Sex
Offenders” but No Sex Crime? What SORA and VOYRA Could Mean for Your Clients, 95
ILL. B.J. 482, 484–85 (2007).
55. See Jeslyn A. Miller, Sex Offender Civil Commitment: The Treatment Paradox, 98
CALIF. L. REV. 2093, 2096 (2010).
56. See Testa & West, supra note 27, at 32.
57. See Miller, supra note 55, at 2096.
58. See id. at 2097.
59. See id.

2015]

HEARSAY EVIDENCE IN SEX OFFENDER HEARINGS

245

treatment provided in civil commitment programs, such programs fell out of
favor, and instead there was “a shift toward determinative sentencing.”60
Two decades later, the first statute calling for the civil commitment of
sex offenders nearing release from prison was enacted in the United
States.61 This statute was enacted in the state of Washington and permits
the state to keep sex offenders in custody when it can be shown that they
are likely to engage in sexually violent behavior.62 Today, twenty states
and the federal government have similar statutes.63
Although state law varies, most states require that an individual be (1) a
convicted sex offender (2) suffering from a mental abnormality (3) that
predisposes him or her to engage in sexual violence.64 In Kansas v.
Hendricks,65 the Supreme Court held that such statutes are constitutional,
despite numerous arguments regarding “due process, double jeopardy, and
ex post facto” challenges.66
The Hendricks decision places great emphasis on the state’s requirement
that, in order for civil commitment proceedings to take place, a convicted
sex offender must suffer from a mental abnormality.67 A mental
abnormality is generally defined as a “condition, disease or disorder . . . that
predisposes [a sex offender] to the commission of conduct constituting a
sex offense and that results in that person having serious difficulty in
controlling such conduct.”68 Examples of mental abnormalities that qualify
60. Id. A determinative, or determinate, sentence is a fixed sentence set for a number of
years in jail or prison, which can only be shortened by credit for time served, good time, and
work time. ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING § 4:3 (3d ed. 2004). Determinate
sentences are contrasted with indeterminate sentences, which, instead of consisting of a fixed
number of years, set forth a minimum and maximum range a prisoner will serve. Id.
61. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010–.903 (West 2008); see also Miller, supra note
55, at 2097.
62. §§ 71.09.010–.903.
63. See Miller, supra note 55, at 2098; see also 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2012); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to -3717 (2009); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600–6609.3 (West
2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 394.910–.932 (West 2011); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
205/1.01–205/12 (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 229A.1–.16 (West 2006); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 59-29a01 to -29a22 (West 2008); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123A, §§ 1–16
(LexisNexis 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 253D.01–.36 (West Supp. 2014); MO. ANN. STAT.
§§ 632.480–.513 (West 2006); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-1201 to -1228 (LexisNexis
2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-E:1–24 (LexisNexis 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:427.24–.38 (West 2008); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.01–.17 (McKinney 2011); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 25-03.3-01 to -23 (2002); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6401–
6409 (West 2013); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-48-10 to -170 (2002); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. §§ 841.001–.150 (West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-900 to -921 (2011);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.09.010–.903; WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 980.01–.14 (West 2007).
64. See Miller, supra note 55, at 2098. For the remainder of this Note, male pronouns
will be used in the context of the civil commitment of dangerous sex offenders, as no female
sex offender has ever been civilly committed in the state of New York.
65. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
66. See id. at 350; see also John M. Fabian, Kansas v. Hendricks, Crane and Beyond:
“Mental Abnormality,” and “Sexual Dangerousness”: Volition Vs. Emotional Abnormality
and the Debate Between Community Safety and Civil Liberties, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1367, 1373 (2003); Vanginderen, supra note 20, at 364–71.
67. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357–59.
68. MENTAL HYG. § 10.03.
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under many civil commitment statutes include pedophilia, bestiality,
exhibitionism, bondage, and sadomasochism.69
Contrary to popular belief, not all sex offenders suffer from mental
abnormalities.70 In fact, various studies report low rates of mental illness in
the sex offender population.71 Nonetheless, experts have found that sex
offenders who do suffer from mental abnormalities, such as the ones
outlined above, are more likely to engage in violent crime.72 They are also
more likely to be involved in the criminal justice system as well as engaged
in violent behavior,73 and it is this type of behavior that Hendricks aims to
reduce.74
3. New York State’s Response to Kansas v. Hendricks
After the Court in Kansas v. Hendricks ruled that the civil commitment
of sex offenders was constitutional, numerous states enacted legislation
targeting dangerous sex offenders suffering from mental abnormalities.75
For example, on April 13, 2007, New York State enacted Chapter 27, Title
B, Article § 10 of the Mental Hygiene Law, also known as the Sex Offender
Management and Treatment Act76 (“Article § 10”) Although prompted by
the holding in Kansas v. Hendricks, Article § 10 was also enacted largely in
response to the murder of Concetta Russo Carriero.77
On the morning of June 29, 2005, the New York State Police Department
found a 56-year-old “petite blond woman” lying in a pool of blood near a
popular mall.78 Hours later, police confronted a shirtless homeless man
soaked in blood, who thereafter admitted that, at the time Carriero was

69. See State v. Peter Y., 952 N.Y.S.2d 651, 652–53 (App. Div. 2012); see also Sean
Ahlmeyer et al., Psychopathology of Incarcerated Sex Offenders, 17 J. PERSONALITY
DISORDERS 306, 307 (2003).
70. See Seena Fazel et al., Severe Mental Illness and Risk of Sexual Offending in Men:
A Case-Control Study Based on Swedish National Registers, 68 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY
588, 588 (2007).
71. See, e.g., Ahlmeyer et al., supra note 69, at 315.
72. See Fazel et al., supra note 70, at 593.
73. See Andrew J. Harris et al., Sex Offending and Serious Mental Illness: Directions
for Policy and Research, 37 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 596, 603 (2010).
74. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357 (1997).
75. See Miller, supra note 55, at 2100. This is not to say such statutes were never
challenged on constitutional grounds. See State v. Nelson, 932 N.Y.S.2d 42, 43–44 (App.
Div. 2011) (rejecting ex post facto, due process, and equal protection arguments); see also
Pratt v. Hogan, 631 F. Supp. 2d 192, 198–99 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (holding sex offender
treatment program not in violation of First and Fifth Amendments); State v. Robert V., No.
251233, 2010 WL 4904400, at *2–6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 29, 2011) (finding, as in Nelson, ex
post facto arguments against Article § 10 without merit).
76. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.01–.17 (McKinney 2011); see infra Part I.C.
77. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF MENTAL HYGIENE LAW ARTICLE 10: SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT
AND TREATMENT ACT OF 2007 3 (2009), http://roc.democratandchronicle.com/assets/pdf/
A21683261224.pdf [http://perma.cc/AAM5-NU5X].
78. Anahad O’Connor, Homeless Man Goes on Trial in Hate-Crime Murder, N.Y.
TIMES (June 13, 2006), www.nytimes.com/2006/06/13/nyregion/13grant.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/9MPQ-A5D9].
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killed, he was hiding in a mall stairwell, waiting to kill someone.79 That
someone was soon identified as Concetta Russo Carriero, a paralegal from
White Plains, New York.80
The shirtless homeless man was later identified as Phillip Grant, a levelthree81 sex offender who was released from prison after serving a twentythree year sentence for two rape convictions and an attempted assault
conviction.82 As a result of this highly publicized case, local officials and
state legislators were prompted to reconsider New York State’s civil
confinement laws.83
The first piece of proposed legislation regarding the civil commitment of
dangerous sex offenders, “Concetta’s Law,” was ultimately unsuccessful as
the State Assembly and Senate were unable to reach a consensus on the
proposed bill.84 As a result, Governor Pataki ordered the Office of Mental
Health and the Department of Corrections to utilize Article § 985 of the
Mental Hygiene Law in order to civilly commit dangerous sex offenders.86
In November 2005, Mental Hygiene Legal Services (MHLS) challenged
Governor Pataki’s order to utilize Article § 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law to
civilly commit dangerous sex offenders.87 The issue reached the Court of
Appeals one year later. In State ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio,88 the court
held that Article § 9 cannot control the civil commitment of sex offenders.89
Instead, the state must file for the civil commitment of dangerous sex
offenders under Correction Law § 402, which provides additional
procedural requirements to ensure due process of law.90

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Level-three sex offenders are at the highest risk of all sex offenders to reoffend and
are considered threats to public safety. Risk Level & Designation Determination, N.Y. STATE
DIV. CRIM. JUST. SERVS., http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/nsor/risk_levels.htm (last
visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/U2MK-WFKU].
82. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 77, at 3.
83. See O’Connor, supra note 78; see also N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH,
supra note 77, at 3 (stating that after Carriero’s murder, Governor Pataki issued a series of
“gubernatorial directives” calling for a reassessment of the civil commitment of dangerous
sex offenders nearing release from prison).
84. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 77, at 3.
85. Article § 9 governs the hospitalization of the mentally ill, generally. N.Y. MENTAL
HYG. LAW §§ 9.01–.63 (McKinney 2011). In order to civilly commit an individual under
Article § 9, two of the individual’s examining physicians must certify that the individual
suffers from a mental illness and requires treatment and care. Id. § 9.27. Further, a person
familiar with the individual must apply for the individual’s admission, outlining the reasons
he or she believes that the individual suffers from a mental illness and requires treatment and
care. Id.
86. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 77, at 3.
87. See id. at 4. Governor Pataki’s order was unique and thus likely to be challenged
because no other state had ever utilized an existing statute to address the civil commitment
of sex offenders. See id. at 3. Further, no other statute permitted the civil commitment of sex
offenders without judicial oversight. See id.
88. 859 N.E.2d 508 (N.Y. 2006).
89. Id. at 512.
90. See id.
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Only one month after MHLS challenged Governor Pataki’s order on
procedural grounds, MHLS brought an action against the state arguing that
the civil commitment of sex offenders violates an individual’s right to
liberty.91 This case eventually made it up to the Court of Appeals;
however, it was interrupted by New York State’s enactment of the Sex
Offender Management and Treatment Act.92
After Harkavy, it became clear to the legislature that, although it would
not be easy, the state would have to enact legislation specifically addressing
the civil commitment of dangerous sex offenders.93 As a result, on April
13, 2007, Article § 10 of the New York State Mental Hygiene Law went
into effect.94
Before examining Article § 10 and its requirements, an understanding of
the laws that govern civil commitment statutes is necessary. The following
section will address these laws generally, as well as specifically in New
York State.
B. Governing Laws of Sex Offender Civil Commitment Statutes
Part I.B examines the laws that govern civil commitment statutes
generally, first addressing the Constitution’s Confrontation Clause. It then
explores New York State’s Civil Practice Law and Rules, specifically New
York State’s general rule against hearsay and its exceptions.
1. The Confrontation Clause
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.”95 The Confrontation Clause is derived from this
amendment.96 The Confrontation Clause requires that individuals accused
of criminal offenses be able to question and cross examine their accusers in
open court.97 Therefore, victims of crimes may be subpoenaed and forced
to testify in order to comply with the Confrontation Clause.98 The Supreme
Court has interpreted the Confrontation Clause to apply to both federal and
state criminal proceedings.99
91. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 77, at 4; see also State ex
rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio, 870 N.E.2d 128, 131 (N.Y. 2007).
92. See N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 77, at 4.
93. See generally Michael Cooper & Danny Hakim, Accord on Bill to Detain Sex
Offenders, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 2007), www.nytimes.com/2007/03/01/nyregion/01civil.
html?fta=y&_r=0 (explaining that it was not until Eliot Spitzer became governor that the
democratic-led assembly agreed to enact such legislation) [http://perma.cc/6APE-43Y8].
The question of whether convicted sex offenders could be civilly committed after they serve
their time was, and remains, an extremely controversial topic in American politics. See id.
94. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.01–.17 (McKinney 2011).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
96. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
97. Id.; see also Martin A. Hewett, A More Reliable Right to Present a Defense: The
Compulsory Process Clause After Crawford v. Washington, 96 GEO. L.J. 273, 274–75
(2007).
98. See Hewett, supra note 97, at 275.
99. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
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The Court has also held, however, that the accused’s right to
confrontation is not absolute.100 For example, in the landmark case of
Maryland v. Craig,101 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that children who
are victims of sexual abuse might suffer severe trauma from testifying in
open court, which may justify implementing “special procedures” regarding
live confrontation.102 As discussed in Part III.B of this Note, children, by
confronting their abusers, may be reexposed to feelings of betrayal,
helplessness, and powerlessness as memories of the abuse are forced to the
forefront of their minds.103
In October 1986, Sandra Ann Craig was charged with child abuse, firstand second-degree sexual offenses, perverted sexual practice, assault, and
battery for sexually abusing a six-year-old girl who attended Craig’s prekindergarten and kindergarten center.104 In March 1987, the State asked the
judge if, at trial, the child could testify per one-way closed circuit television
(CCTV) to eliminate the need for the child to confront her abuser.105
One-way CCTV involves one camera and one monitor.106 The judge,
prosecutor, defense attorney, and witness sit in one room with the camera,
and the jury and defendant sit in the courtroom with the monitor.107 The
witness is subject to direct and cross examination; however, because the
witness is not present in the courtroom, the witness does not have to see his
or her abuser.108 The defendant must be able to communicate with his or
her attorney at all times.109
In Craig, the trial court permitted the six-year-old girl to testify via oneway CCTV, and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision.110 The Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed and
remanded, holding that permitting the child to testify via one-way CCTV
violated the defendant’s right to confrontation.111 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.112
After hearing arguments from both the State and Craig, the Supreme
Court held that, if the state adequately shows that it is necessary to
implement “special procedures” (i.e., using one-way CCTV) in order to
protect a child from the trauma of testifying in open court, there is no
violation of a defendant’s right to confrontation.113 The Court reasoned
that, in some cases, “a State’s interest in the physical and psychological
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
497 U.S. 836 (1990).
Id. at 855.
See infra note 391 and accompanying text.
Craig, 497 U.S. at 840.
Id.
NAT’L CTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE & NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N,
CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION STATUTES 1 (2012).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Craig, 497 U.S. at 843.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 855.
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well-being” of child victims of sexual assault outweighs the right to face-toface confrontation.114 The Court supported its decision by citing to the
conclusions set forth in an amicus curiae brief115 filed by the American
Psychological Association.116 The American Psychological Association
urged the Court to adopt special procedures avoiding live confrontation
because legal proceedings are particularly stressful for children who are
victims of sexual assault, and such stress may negatively impact their
“normal cognitive and emotional development.”117
The Supreme Court’s holding in Craig that the right to confrontation is
not absolute has had a significant impact on the defendant’s right to
confrontation in child abuse cases.118 Craig’s holding validated thirtyseven states’ authorization of the use of videotaped testimony in child abuse
cases,119 twenty-four states’ authorization of the use of one-way CCTV,120
and eight states’ authorization of the use of two-way CCTV.121
114. Id. at 853; see also Spigarolo v. Meachum, 934 F.2d 19, 24–25 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that because child victims would suffer trauma from testifying in front of their
abusers, videotaped testimony could be used).
115. An amicus curiae brief is a brief submitted to the court by a nonparty with a
particular interest in the case; the nonparty must get the court’s permission to file. Amicus
Curiae, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/amicus
%20curiae (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/SDX6-XVYA].
116. See Brief for American Psychological Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither
Party, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990) (No. 89–478).
117. Id. at 7.
118. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 850; see also L. Christine Brannon, The Trauma of Testifying
in Court for Child Victims of Sexual Assault V. the Accused’s Right to Confrontation, 18
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 439, 446–48 (1994).
119. Craig, 497 U.S. at 853; see also ALA. CODE § 15-25-2 (LexisNexis 2011); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-44-203 (1999); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1346 (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-3-413, 18-6-401.3 (2013); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3511 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 92.53 (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 626-1, Rule 616 (West 2008); 725 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/106B-5 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-8 (LexisNexis 2012);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.38 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3434 (West 2008); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (LexisNexis 2005); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16D (LexisNexis
2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2163a(5) (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02
(West 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-407 (West 2013); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 491.675–.725
(West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-402 (West 2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 291926 (LexisNexis 2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 174.227–.231 (LexisNexis 2011); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 517:13-a (LexisNexis 2006); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17 (West 2003);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.481 (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2611.3–
.11 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.460 (West 2003); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5984.1 (West 2013); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 163-1550 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-12-9 (1998); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-7-117, 120 (2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 967.04 (West 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-408 (2013);
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (West 2005); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 15.5; VT. R. EVID.
807.
120. Craig, 497 U.S. at 853–54; see also ALA. CODE § 15-25-3 (LexisNexis 2011);
ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.046 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4253 (2010); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 54-86g (West 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 92.54 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 17-8-55 (2013); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/106B-5 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 3537-4-8 (LexisNexis 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 915.38 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 223434 (West 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.350 (LexisNexis 2005); LA. STAT. ANN.
§ 15:283 (2007); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 16D (LexisNexis 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 595.02 (West 2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-1-405 (West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN.
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Shortly after Craig, Congress enacted the Child Victims’ and Child
Witnesses’ Rights Act.122 The Child Victims’ and Child Witnesses’ Rights
Act permits child victims to either testify via two-way CCTV123 or by
videotaped depositions.124 In United States v. Farley,125 the defendant
challenged the constitutionality of this statute; however, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld its constitutionality because the state
could show, in that specific case, that the child victim would be emotionally
incapable of testifying in front of her abuser.126 The court held that,
because a psychologist’s testimony sufficiently established that the victim
would be overcome with fear, and thus severely traumatized from
confronting her abuser, there was no Sixth Amendment violation.127
2. New York State’s Civil Practice Law and Rules:
The General Rule Against Hearsay
In criminal proceedings, the accused are most often, but not always,
guaranteed the right to confront their accusers.128 The Confrontation
Clause does not, however, apply to civil proceedings.129 Rather, in New
York State civil proceedings, the accused are afforded the protections
outlined in the New York State Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR).130
One of the most pertinent rules for civil commitment cases under the CPLR
is New York State’s general rule against hearsay.131

§ 2A:84A-32.4 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2611.3–.11 (West 2009); OR.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.460 (West 2003); 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5985 (West
2013); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-13.2 (2002); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-303
(LexisNexis 2008); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (West 2005); UTAH R. CRIM.
P. 15.5; VT. R. EVID. 807.
121. Craig, 497 U.S. at 854; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347 (West 2004); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 626-1, Rule 616 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 9-1801 to -1808 (2010);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.481 (LexisNexis
2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.9 (2009); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 65.00–.30 (McKinney
2004); VT. R. EVID. 807.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2012).
123. Id. § 3509(b)(1). When a child testifies via two-way CCTV, the child sits in a room
with the prosecutor and the defense attorney. See Aaron Harmon, Child Testimony via TwoWay Closed Circuit Television: A New Perspective on Maryland v. Craig in United States v.
Turning Bear and United States v. Bordeaux, 7 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 157, 157–58 (2005). The
child’s testimony is recorded and live streamed to the courtroom, where the defendant is also
being recorded. Id. The child is able to view the defendant on a monitor, and the defendant
is able to view the child on a monitor. Id.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(2).
125. 992 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1993).
126. Id. at 1125.
127. Id. at 1124–25.
128. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990).
129. DEBORAH J. MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE FEDERAL
RULES TO THE COURTROOM 701 (2d ed. 2011); see also David Alan Sklansky, Confrontation
and Fairness, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 103, 110 (2012) (explaining that even in high-stakes
civil cases, such as cases involving civil commitment, the Confrontation Clause is
inapplicable).
130. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 101 (MCKINNEY 2003).
131. See People v. Edwards, 392 N.E.2d 1229, 1230–31 (N.Y. 1979).
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Hearsay evidence is defined as “(1) an out-of-court assertion that is (2)
offered to prove its truth.”132 The Federal Rules of Evidence expand on this
definition, defining hearsay as “a statement that: (1) the declarant does not
make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and [that] (2) a party
offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the
statement.”133
In general, statements about whether something is true that are not made
in court and subject to cross examination are considered hearsay
evidence.134 Thus, such statements are inadmissible in court.135 Hearsay
evidence is generally inadmissible because it is thought to be
untrustworthy—it is not made under oath, in the presence of the trier of
fact, or subject to cross examination.136 New York State, however, has
carved out certain exceptions to the general rule against hearsay.137
3. New York State’s Exceptions to the General Rule Against Hearsay
Part I.B.3 presents four exceptions to New York State’s general rule
against hearsay: (1) the professional reliability exception, (2) the exception
for excited utterances, (3) the exception for statements made for purposes of
medical treatment or diagnosis, and (4) the exception for when the
defendant causes the declarant’s unavailability.
a. The Professional Reliability Exception
The professional reliability exception states that a “psychiatrist may rely
on material, albeit of out-of-court origin, if it is of a kind accepted in the
profession as reliable in forming a professional opinion” or if it “comes
from a witness subject to full cross examination on the trial.”138 Under the
professional reliability exception, hearsay evidence may only be used in
forming an expert’s opinion and may not be introduced to establish the
validity of the evidence.139
There are two ways to satisfy the professional reliability exception.140
The first way provides that, in forming their opinions, psychiatric
examiners may rely on documents that are traditionally relied upon by
experts in the field.141 It is up to the court to determine whether such
documents are traditionally relied upon,142 and the jury is explicitly

132. DAVID F. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK § 1:1 (4th ed. 2001).
133. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
134. See Edwards, 392 N.E.2d at 1230–31.
135. See id.
136. See BINDER, supra note 132, § 3:2.
137. See infra Part I.B.3.
138. People v. Sugden, 323 N.E.2d 169, 173 (N.Y. 1974) (establishing the professional
reliability exception).
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. See Hambsch v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 469 N.E.2d 516, 517–18 (N.Y. 1984).
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instructed that a psychiatric examiner’s reliance on a document does not
establish its validity.143
The second way to satisfy the professional reliability exception pertains
to witnesses subject to “full cross-examination on the trial.”144 The
rationale behind this exception is that testimony about statements made
outside of court can be verified and/or challenged during cross
examination.145
b. The Exception for Excited Utterances
New York State also recognizes an exception to the general rule against
hearsay for excited utterances.146 An excited utterance is an out-of-court
statement made when an individual is in a stressful, startling situation.147
The justification for admitting excited utterances into evidence is that, due
to the nature of a stressful, startling situation, the individual making the
statement is incapable of altering the truth.148
In determining whether the excited utterance exception applies, the main
focus is the mental state of the declarant.149 Other considerations include
the time between the startling event and the declaration, whether the
declarant was questioned, and whether the declarant was, at the time of the
declaration, suffering from a serious injury.150 Although these factors
should be considered in making the determination of whether an excited
utterance is admissible, no one factor alone is dispositive.151 The critical
question remains: “whether the declarant is capable of studied reflection
and therefore incapable of fabrication.”152
For example, in People v. Powell,153 the New York State Appellate
Division affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit hearsay evidence
pursuant to the excited utterance exception.154 On November 2, 1998, the
143. See State v. Wilkes, 908 N.Y.S.2d 495, 497 (App. Div. 2010); People v. Campbell,
602 N.Y.S.2d 282, 284 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that “hearsay testimony given by experts
is admissible for the limited purpose of informing the jury of the basis of the expert’s
opinion and not for the truth of the matters related”).
144. See Sugden, 323 N.E.2d at 173.
145. See Elliott Scheinberg, Hearsay Testimony Through the Expert Witness, 86 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 35, 36 (2014). In general, the professional reliability exception is highly debated among
legal scholars; however, such debates are beyond the scope of this Note. See id. at 36–42;
see also John M. Curran, The “Professional Reliability” Basis for Expert Opinion
Testimony, 85 N.Y. ST. B.J. 22, 24–25 (2013); Colleen D. Duffy, The Admissibility of Expert
Opinion and the Bases of Expert Opinion in Sex Offender Civil Management Trials in New
York, 75 ALB. L. REV. 763, 773 (2012).
146. People v. Johnson, 804 N.E.2d 402, 405 (N.Y. 2003); see also 5A ROBERT A.
BARKER & VINCENT C. ALEXANDER, EVIDENCE IN NEW YORK STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS
§ 8:31 (2d ed. 2011).
147. Johnson, 804 N.E.2d at 405.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 405–06.
151. See id. at 406.
152. Id.
153. 732 N.Y.S.2d 216 (App. Div. 2001).
154. Id. at 216.
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defendant, Bobby Powell, was convicted of first-degree rape for raping his
neighbor at knifepoint.155 Almost immediately after being raped, the
complainant made four statements that the defendant argued were
inadmissible hearsay.156 The complainant’s first statement was to her
roommate, telling her that she had been raped.157 The second statement
was to the building’s supervisor, identifying Bobby Powell as her rapist.158
The third and fourth statements were made to police officers, telling them
that she had been raped and identifying Bobby Powell as her rapist.159
The Supreme Court admitted all four statements into evidence under the
hearsay exception for excited utterances, and the Appellate Division
affirmed.160 The Appellate Division reasoned that because the complainant
spoke under extreme stress from a forcible rape, the complainant was
incapable of reflection and distorting the truth.161 The Appellate Division
elaborated that, because the amount of time between the rape and the
statements was relatively short, the witnesses agreed on the timing of the
statements, and the complainant was “still crying, shaking and very upset,”
the complainant’s statements were admissible hearsay under the exception
for excited utterances.162
The court in Powell not only admitted into evidence statements about
whether a rape occurred, but also statements identifying the complainant’s
rapist.163 This holding suggests that under certain conditions, courts will
extend great latitude in determining whether the excited utterance exception
applies.164
c. The Exception for Statements Made for Purposes
of Medical Treatment or Diagnosis
Another exception to the general rule against hearsay is the exception for
statements made for the purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis.165
Although New York State’s recognition of this exception is relatively new,
New York State courts have admitted statements made for the purposes of
medical treatment or diagnosis pertaining to the way in which an individual
was injured166 as well as the cause of an individual’s injury.167

155. See Powell v. Greiner, No. 02 Civ. 7352(LBS), 2003 WL 359466, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 18, 2003).
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. People v. Powell, 732 N.Y.S.2d 216, 216 (App. Div. 2001).
161. See id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See id.
165. See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 146, § 8:33.
166. See People v. Dennee, 738 N.Y.S.2d 146, 147 (App. Div. 2002) (holding that the
physician’s testimony regarding the declarant’s description of the manner in which the
declarant was injured was admissible under the hearsay exception for statements made for
purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis); Scott v. Mason, 547 N.Y.S.2d 889, 891 (App.
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In most cases, the name of an individual who has injured or harmed a
declarant has not been admitted under the exception for statements made for
the purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis.168 In domestic violence and
child abuse cases, however, courts have been more lenient.169
For example, in People v. Ortega,170 the Court of Appeals admitted into
evidence statements explicitly identifying the defendant as the abuser
because such statements were made during the complainant’s treatment for
domestic violence.171 The court went a step further in holding that another
complainant’s statements identifying the defendant as the person who
forced the complainant to “smoke a white, powdery substance” was also
admissible as it was relevant to the complainant’s treatment at the
hospital.172
In two additional cases, People v. Spicola173 and People v. Duhs,174 the
Court of Appeals permitted statements identifying two child abusers
because the statements made identifying the defendants were “germane” to
diagnosis and treatment.175 These rulings suggest a shift in the Court of
Appeals toward a more liberal interpretation of the hearsay exception for
statements made for purposes of medical treatment and diagnosis.176
d. The Exception for When a Party Causes the Declarant’s Unavailability
One last exception to the general rule against hearsay evidence is the
admissibility of hearsay evidence when the accused causes the declarant’s
unavailability.177 The New York State Court of Appeals defines “causing
the declarant’s unavailability” as being “responsible for or [acquiescing] in
the conduct” that made the witness unavailable for trial.178 Most
commonly, such “conduct” consists of intimidation or violence,179 but it
may also take the form of threats, chicanery, or bribery.180
In specific circumstances, courts have interpreted the exception for the
admissibility of hearsay when the defendant causes the declarant’s
unavailability more broadly.181 For example, in People v. Byrd,182 the
Appellate Division concluded that, although the defendant did not explicitly
Div. 1989) (holding that the physician’s testimony regarding the declarant’s description that
his van was hit by some sort of motor vehicle was admissible under the hearsay exception).
167. See People v. Thomas, 725 N.Y.S.2d 102, 104 (App. Div. 2001).
168. See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 146, § 8:33.
169. See id.
170. 942 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 2010).
171. Id. at 215.
172. Id. at 216.
173. 947 N.E.2d 620 (N.Y. 2011).
174. 947 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 2011).
175. Id. at 618; Spicola, 947 N.E.2d at 625.
176. See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 146, § 8:33.
177. See People v. Geraci, 649 N.E.2d 817, 824 (N.Y. 1995).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 820.
180. See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 146, § 8:97.
181. See infra notes 184, 186 and accompanying text.
182. 855 N.Y.S.2d 505 (App. Div. 2008).
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coerce the complainant into refusing to testify, hearsay evidence was
nonetheless admissible.183 Because the complainant suffered from battered
person syndrome stemming from years of physical and emotional abuse, the
court determined that the defendant caused the complainant’s unavailability
and admitted the hearsay evidence.184
Similarly, in People v. Jernigan,185 the Appellate Division concluded that
it was unnecessary to show that the defendant made threats against the
declarant in order for the hearsay exception to apply.186 Instead, if the
declarant would feel pressured not to testify because of a prior abusive
relationship, the hearsay exception would apply.187
In both Byrd and Jernigan, the complainants endured serious abuse by
the defendants.188 The facts of these cases suggest that, in the absence of
explicit threats, violence, or intimidation, the admissibility of hearsay when
a defendant causes a declarant’s unavailability should be determined on a
case-by-case basis with regard for the severity of the underlying facts.189
This is particularly relevant in sex offender civil commitment cases, which
involve repeat, chronic sex offenders who commit serious crimes against
their victims.190
After fully understanding the laws and rules that apply to civil
commitment proceedings, it is then possible to explore the substance of
New York State’s Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act. In the
following section, each part of this statute is thoroughly examined.
C. New York State’s Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act
The New York State legislature cites numerous reasons for the enactment
of Article § 10.191 First and foremost, the legislature explains that certain
sex offenders pose a threat to society that should be addressed by sex
offender programs and treatment.192 The legislature goes on to explain that,
because the civil and criminal systems have different goals, both systems
should be used in tandem in order to “respond to current needs of individual
offenders,” “provide meaningful treatment,” and “protect the public.”193
The legislature is careful to note that Article § 10 addresses sex offenders
with mental abnormalities that make them more likely to commit repeated
sex offenses.194 Further, because some sex offenders suffering from certain
mental abnormalities require specific, elongated treatment, such treatment

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See id. at 507, 510.
Id.
838 N.Y.S.2d 81 (App. Div. 2007).
Id. at 82.
Id.
Byrd, 855 N.Y.S.2d at 507; Jernigan, 838 N.Y.S.2d at 82.
See BARKER & ALEXANDER, supra note 146, § 8:97.
See S. 3318, 230th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 61 (N.Y. 2007).
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01 (McKinney 2011).
Id. § 10.01(a).
Id.
Id. § 10.01(b).
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may only be accomplished through the civil process after a sex offender’s
release from prison.195
Civil commitment is not the only solution the legislature proposes under
Article § 10.196 In fact, the legislature recognizes that some sex offenders
may be monitored in the community under strict and intensive supervision
and treatment.197 Further, appropriate criminal sentences may be a way to
address the problem of dangerous sex offenders.198 The determination of
whether a sex offender should be civilly committed, released on community
supervision, or given a longer sentence should be made with a consideration
for “protect[ing] the public, reduc[ing] recidivism, and ensur[ing] offenders
have access to proper treatment.”199
All Article § 10 proceedings are prompted by a recommendation from the
Office of Mental Health that a sex offender nearing release from prison is
likely to suffer from a mental abnormality, which would make him likely to
pose a danger to society.200 The Office of Mental Health receives notice
that a detained sex offender is anticipating release201 from prison from any
“agency with jurisdiction,” which is most often the Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision.202 Once the Office of Mental
Health is provided with notice that a detained sex offender is nearing
release from prison, the commissioner of mental health is permitted to
authorize an initial evaluation of that individual.203 If a preliminary review
does take place, the initial evaluator is permitted to review all of the sex
offender’s prior records.204 “If the case review team determines that the
respondent is not a sex offender requiring civil management,” no petition
will be filed, and the respondent will be released on his anticipated release
195. See id.
196. See id. § 10.01(c).
197. Id. On June 17, 2015, the New York State Assembly introduced a bill that would
eliminate the alternative of strict and intensive supervision and treatment. N.Y. Assemb.
8275, 238th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015). Upon publication of this Note, the bill has yet to
be voted on.
198. MENTAL HYG. § 10.01(d).
199. Id. § 10.01(c).
200. See id. § 10.05.
201. Various courts have had to interpret the meaning of “anticipating release” in various
contexts. See State v. D.J., 873 N.Y.S.2d 482, 486 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (holding that because
respondent was a voluntary patient who could seek release at any time, the State was not
premature in its petition); State v. Swartz, 852 N.Y.S.2d 689, 692 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (ruling
that Article § 10 does not set forth the earliest date the state can petition for the civil
commitment of a dangerous sex offender).
202. MENTAL HYG. § 10.05(b).
203. Id. § 10.05(d). A respondent is not entitled to counsel at a preliminary evaluation.
See State v. John P., 982 N.E.2d 587, 588 (N.Y. 2012); State v. Timothy BB., 975 N.Y.S.2d
237, 240–41 (App. Div. 2013) (holding that respondent “was not deprived of the effective
assistance of counsel”); State v. Robert F., 958 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159 (App. Div. 2012); State v.
Pierce, 914 N.Y.S.2d 547, 549 (App. Div. 2010).
204. MENTAL HYG. § 10.05(d). Records include “relevant medical, clinical, criminal, and
institutional records, actuarial risk assessment instruments and other records and reports,
including records of parole release interviews . . . and records and reports provided by the
district attorney of the county where the person was convicted, or . . . the county where the
person was charged.” Id.
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date.205 If the case review team does find that the respondent is a sex
offender requiring civil management, the respondent and the attorney
general will be notified,206 and the state may then file a petition for the civil
commitment of the respondent.207
Unlike during the preliminary evaluation conducted by the Office of
Mental Health, a respondent is entitled to counsel as soon as the state files a
petition against him.208 If a respondent cannot afford to hire his own
counsel, counsel must be appointed to him.209 In most cases, an attorney
from MHLS is appointed to a respondent.210 In the rare occasion that
MHLS cannot take a case, a respondent will be appointed an 18-B
lawyer.211
After a respondent is appointed counsel, the state may request that a
psychiatric professional, chosen by the state, evaluate the respondent.212
Once the respondent has met with a state-chosen psychiatric professional,
but no later than thirty days after the initial petition is filed, the court must
conduct a probable cause hearing.213 Generally, a probable cause hearing
consists primarily of expert witness testimony.214 A state-appointed
psychiatric examiner, most often from the Office of Mental Health, will
testify regarding whether she believes the respondent is more likely than not
to suffer from a mental abnormality.215 The respondent may also call an

205. Id. § 10.05(f). But see State v. Frederick P., No. 2009-17437, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 20, 2010) (holding that a finding that a respondent does not suffer from a mental
abnormality does not preclude the finding that the same respondent suffers from a mental
abnormality at a subsequent point in time).
206. MENTAL HYG. § 10.05(g).
207. Id. § 10.06(a).
208. Id. § 10.06(c).
209. Id.
210. Id.; see also id. § 47.01.
211. Id. § 10.06(c). An 18-B lawyer is a private attorney appointed by the court to
represent indigent clients. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea
Bargaining as Negotiation, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 128 n.62 (1997). 18-B lawyers
are compensated by the government. Id. at 128.
212. MENTAL HYG. § 10.06(d). Requiring a respondent to be evaluated by a state-chosen
psychiatric examiner has caused many problems in court. See, e.g., State v. Charles G., No.
10322/08 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 17, 2008) (arguing that a second evaluation of the respondent
take place). For example, in State v. C.B., the respondent refused an evaluation with a statechosen psychiatric examiner, arguing that, because he was evaluated twice before under
Article § 9, there was no good cause to be evaluated again. No. 341104, 2008 WL 483750, at
*2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 2008). The court ruled against the respondent, holding that
Article § 9 evaluations served a different purpose than Article § 10 evaluations. Id. at *3.
The court has also held that under certain circumstances, a respondent may be subject to
more than one evaluation. See State v. Richard Z., No. 2007-2605 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 1,
2010); State v. Brian J., No. 2009-61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18, 2010). Further, the court has
held that the state may not videotape evaluations conducted by psychiatric examiners. See
State v. Bernard D., 877 N.Y.S.2d 84, 84–85 (App. Div. 2009); In re Charles S., 875
N.Y.S.2d 263, 263–64 (App. Div. 2009); State v. R.H., No. 002826, 2008 WL 4837632, at
*1–4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 5, 2008); State v. Hall, No. 2424/07, 2007 WL 3306944, at *1–2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 7, 2007).
213. MENTAL HYG. § 10.06(g).
214. See id. §§ 10.06, 10.08.
215. See id.
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expert witness to testify on this issue.216 It is this expert testimony, based
on an evaluation of the respondent, as well as any other relevant
documents,217 that the court will use in making its determination.218 At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court will either dismiss the petition and
release the respondent in accordance with the law or order the respondent to
a secure treatment facility, set a date for trial, and order the respondent not
be released until the completion of trial.219
Article § 10.07(a) states that, within sixty days after a probable cause
hearing, the court must conduct a jury trial to determine whether the
respondent is a detained sex offender suffering from a mental
abnormality.220 Article § 10.07(b) sets forth the rules that govern the jury
trial,221 and as in probable cause hearings, Article § 10.08(g) outlines the
types of evidence admissible at trial.222 Further, also as in probable cause
hearings, the jury will generally hear one expert witness on behalf of the
state and one expert witness on behalf of the respondent.223 After both
sides are fully heard by the jury, the jury will determine “by clear and
convincing evidence whether the respondent is a detained sex offender who
suffers from a mental abnormality.”224
If the jury determines that the state has not met its burden, the respondent
should be released in full accordance with the law.225 If the jury
unanimously finds that the state has met its burden in showing that the

216. See id.
217. See id. There have been a number of cases challenging the admissibility of evidence
at civil commitment hearings. See State v. Little Luke KK., 894 N.Y.S.2d 605, 609–10 (App.
Div. 2010) (holding that the state properly limited the respondent’s expert witness from
testifying to the appropriateness of his placement in a secure treatment facility); State v.
Dove, 846 N.Y.S.2d 863, 865–66 (Sup. Ct. 2007) (precluding hearsay evidence in
respondent’s presentence and parole reports because they did not fall into any hearsay
exception, but denying respondent’s request that the court not consider actuarial test results).
218. There have also been a number of cases challenging whether the evidence provided
at the hearing was sufficient to establish probable cause. See State v. P.H., 874 N.Y.S.2d
733, 749–50 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding that the state’s expert witness’s opinion was based on
more than just unspecified studies and that the respondent’s apparent inability to control
voyeurism and exhibitionism was enough to establish that there was probable cause that the
respondent suffered from a mental abnormality); State v. Stanfield, No. 250519, 2008 WL
2184891, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 27, 2008) (holding that the expert testimony of the
psychiatric examiner, the scores on two actuarial tools, the respondent’s criminal history,
and the commission of crimes while on parole were enough to establish probable cause).
219. MENTAL HYG. § 10.06(k).
220. Id. § 10.07(a). Although § 10.07(a) sets forth a sixty-day requirement, courts have
been lenient with enforcing it. See State v. Trombley, 951 N.Y.S.2d 782, 784 (App. Div.
2012) (holding that a delay in trial did not violate the respondent’s due process because the
delay was caused by the respondent’s consistent requests for adjournments).
221. MENTAL HYG. § 10.07(b). “[A]rticle forty-one of the civil practice law and rules
shall apply” except that, when article forty-one is inconsistent with the rules of criminal
procedure, “sections 270.05, 270.10, 270.15, 270.20, subdivision one of section 270.25, and
subdivision one of section 270.35” of the rules of criminal procedure shall apply. Id.
222. Id. §§ 10.07(c), 10.08(g); see also infra Part II.A.
223. MENTAL HYG. § 10.06(d)–(e).
224. Id. § 10.07(d).
225. Id. § 10.07(f).
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respondent is a detained sex offender suffering from a mental abnormality,
the court must then hold a dispositional hearing.226
If the jury determines that the respondent is a detained sex offender
suffering from a mental abnormality, the court must determine whether the
respondent is so dangerous that he requires inpatient treatment or whether
he is suited to be released on strict and intensive supervision and
treatment.227 At a dispositional hearing, both the state and the respondent
are permitted to offer additional evidence pertaining to the issue of
dangerousness.228 As during the trial phase, the standard of proof is clear
and convincing evidence.229
Article § 10.07(f) explains that, if the court finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the respondent is so dangerous as to require confinement, the
respondent will be sent to a secure facility for treatment until he no longer
requires confinement.230 If a respondent is determined to require
confinement, Article § 10.09 and Article § 10.10 govern his right to annual
examinations and petitions for discharge,231 as well as for treatment and
confinement, respectively.232
If the court, however, does not find that a respondent is so dangerous as
to require confinement, the court will order a respondent to be subject to
“strict and intensive supervision” and treatment233 (SIST). Article § 10.11
governs the “regimen” of SIST.234 Generally, a respondent on strict and
intensive supervision and treatment must abide by a list of roughly seventy
conditions and, if found to be in violation of one or more conditions, risks
being civilly committed to a secure treatment facility.235
II. AN EXAMINATION OF PERMISSIBLE HEARSAY EVIDENCE AFTER
STATE V. FLOYD Y. VERSUS THE REQUIREMENTS OF ARTICLE § 10
Part I of this Note explored the history of civil commitment in the United
States, the laws that govern civil commitment statutes, and New York
State’s Sex Offender Management and Treatment Act. Part II begins with a
thorough examination of the admissibility of hearsay evidence in New York
State civil commitment hearings under the Sex Offender Management and
Treatment Act both before and after the New York State Court of Appeals
decision in State v. Floyd Y. It then explores the Floyd Y. decision as it
relates to the Confrontation Clause, New York State’s Civil Practice Law
and Rules, and Article § 10’s legislative intent.

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.; see also infra note 235 and accompanying text.
MENTAL HYG. § 10.07(f).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. § 10.09.
See id. § 10.10.
Id. § 10.07(f).
Id. § 10.11.
See id.
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A. The Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence
in Article § 10 Cases and State v. Floyd Y.
Part II.A first outlines what types of evidence Article § 10 permits at civil
commitment proceedings. It then explores the events leading up to the
Floyd Y. decision as well as the court’s holding.
1. Evidence Admissible Under Article § 10
The most important piece of evidence in an Article § 10 proceeding is a
psychiatric examiner’s report.236 A psychiatric examiner’s report outlines,
in the examiner’s expert opinion, whether the respondent suffers from a
mental abnormality and the evidence utilized to come to that
determination.237 Article § 10.08(g) of the New York State Mental
Hygiene Law, for both probable cause hearings and trials, mandates that, in
three specific circumstances, any psychiatric examiner’s report, if relevant,
is permissible regardless of whether the psychiatric examiner is available to
testify.238 These three circumstances include (1) when the report is certified
or authenticated by the “head of the hospital, laboratory, department or
bureau of a municipal corporation or of the state, or by an employee
delegated for that purpose or by a qualified physician,”239 (2) when the
report is presented at a probable cause hearing,240 and (3) when the report is
presented at a hearing regarding a respondent’s SIST.241 In all other cases,
however, the psychiatric examiner must be able to testify or must be able to
show good cause as to why she is not able to testify.242
Article § 10.08(g) also states that any relevant documents and testimony
regarding the respondent’s underlying criminal offenses are admissible.243
While the types of evidence Article § 10.08(g) deems admissible may seem
to encompass everything the attorney general would need to make a case,
Article § 10.08(g) does not address the admissibility of hearsay evidence in
Article § 10 cases.244
As discussed in Part I.B.2 of this Note, hearsay evidence is defined as
“(1) an out-of-court assertion that is (2) offered to prove its truth.”245 In
civil cases, if a declarant of a statement is unable or unwilling to testify in
court, the court must either find an exception to the hearsay rule for which
236. See Duffy, supra note 145, at 772.
237. See id.
238. MENTAL HYG. § 10.08(g).
239. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4518(c) (McKinney 2007) (stating that “[a]ll records, writings
and other things referred to in sections 2306 and 2307 are admissible in evidence under this
rule and are prima facie evidence of the facts contained, provided they bear a certification or
authentication by the head of the hospital, laboratory, department or bureau of a municipal
corporation or of the state, or by an employee delegated for that purpose or by a qualified
physician”).
240. See MENTAL HYG. § 10.06(g)–(h).
241. See id. § 10.11(a)(2), (d)(4), (e), (g)–(h).
242. Id. § 10.08(g).
243. Id.
244. See id.
245. See BINDER, supra note 132, § 1:1.
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the statement applies or forego using such hearsay evidence.246 In the
Article § 10 setting, the most pertinent exception to the general rule against
hearsay is the professional reliability exception.247
2. Article § 10 and the Professional Reliability Exception
Article § 10.08(g) describes which types of evidence are admissible at
Article § 10 proceedings but fails to explicitly state whether hearsay
evidence is admissible.248 This is a particularly important issue in Article
§ 10 proceedings as psychiatric examiners, in forming their opinions about
whether a respondent suffers from a mental abnormality, base their
decisions not only on evaluations of respondents but also on respondents’
records.249 A respondent’s records may include materials from the
Department of Corrections, medical records, pre-sentence reports, rap
sheets, parole reports, police reports, Office of Mental Health records, court
transcripts, and reports made by other psychiatric professionals.250
Because many of these documents contain hearsay evidence and because
Article § 10 does not explicitly contemplate the admissibility of hearsay
evidence, courts have been charged with interpreting the admissibility of
hearsay evidence in Article § 10 proceedings.251 Although Article § 10
does not explicitly outline the admissibility of hearsay evidence,252 Article
§ 10.07(c) states that Article § 10.08(g) and Article § 45 of the Civil
Practice Law and Rules are applicable in Article § 10 proceedings.253
Utilizing the guidance set forth in § 10.07(c), the court has determined that
“[t]he inclusion of Article 45 as the evidentiary standard suggests that at an
Article 10 trial, as a civil trial generally, hearsay should not generally be
admissible.”254
Nonetheless, the court has carved out certain exceptions for when
hearsay evidence should be permitted.255 The most pertinent hearsay
exception to Article § 10 cases is the “professional reliability exception.”256
The professional reliability exception, which is defined in Part I.B.3.a of
this Note, states that a “psychiatrist may rely on material, albeit of out-ofcourt origin, if it is of a kind accepted in the profession as reliable in
forming a professional opinion” or if it “comes from a witness subject to
full cross-examination on the trial.”257

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

See supra Part I.B.3.
See supra Part I.B.3.a.
MENTAL HYG. § 10.08(g).
See Duffy, supra note 145, at 765–66.
See id.
See infra note 252 and accompanying text.
State v. J.A., 868 N.Y.S.2d 841, 845 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
MENTAL HYG. § 10.07(c).
J.A., 868 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
See supra Part I.B.3.
See People v. Sugden, 323 N.E.2d 169, 173 (N.Y. 1974).
Id.
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3. Events Leading Up to the Floyd Y. Decision
Almost immediately after the enactment of Article § 10, the professional
reliability exception began to play an integral role in admitting hearsay
evidence in Article § 10 proceedings.258 At trial, the state would generally
contend that such hearsay was admissible, arguing it is consistent with the
professional reliability exception to the hearsay rule.259 Conversely, the
respondent would attempt to preclude such evidence, arguing that the state
witness’s expert opinion was based on inadmissible hearsay evidence.260
After a number of similar Article § 10 cases were decided, the court
seemed to have outlined a bright-line rule regarding the admissibility of
hearsay evidence.261 In State v. Pierce,262 the court held that because
“parole board documents, pre-sentence reports, accusatory instruments,
certificates of conviction, police reports and respondent’s criminal records”
were of the kind normally relied upon by experts in forming their opinions,
such records were admissible under the professional reliability exception.263
Various New York State Supreme Courts have upheld Pierce’s ruling in
subsequent Article § 10 proceedings.264
One issue that the Pierce decision did not address, however, was whether
hearsay evidence regarding charges that are eventually dropped or crimes
with which an individual is never charged is admissible in court.265 This
issue was first addressed in State v. Shawn X.,266 when the court held that

258. See State v. Wilkes, 908 N.Y.S.2d 495, 496–97 (App. Div. 2010) (holding that
parole documents and conversations with defendant’s father were sufficiently reliable
hearsay to form basis of expert psychological opinion as the record contained testimony of
psychologist that such documents are accepted in the psychological profession as a basis
upon which to form an opinion); State v. Joseph B., No. 4730-08, at *4–5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
June 24, 2009) (holding that because records documenting prior convictions are traditionally
relied upon by psychiatric examiners in forming their opinions about mental abnormality,
such records are admissible under the professional reliability exception); J.A., 868 N.Y.S.2d
at 849–50 (finding some hearsay reliable and falling under professional reliability exception
where respondent pled guilty to crime and where evidence supported by trial transcripts).
259. See Duffy, supra note 145, at 766.
260. See id. at 767.
261. See infra note 263 and accompanying text.
262. 914 N.Y.S.2d 547 (App. Div. 2010).
263. Id. at 548–49.
264. See State v. Anonymous, 920 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197 (App. Div. 2011) (holding that the
appellant established the reliability of hearsay evidence by pleading guilty to the sex
offenses and relaying the details of the sex offenses to experts that examined him); State v.
Mark S., 924 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663–64 (App. Div. 2011) (holding that under the professional
reliability exception to the hearsay rule, an expert witness could rely on presentence reports,
SORA records, and parole revocation records because the expert testified that those records
are of the type commonly relied upon in the Article § 10 setting); State v. Fox, 914 N.Y.S.2d
550, 551 (App. Div. 2010) (holding that, because petitioner’s expert testified that he relied
on documents specifically deemed reliable by Mental Hygiene Law § 10.08, there was no
need for petitioner’s expert to state that such documents were traditionally relied upon by
experts in the field).
265. See Pierce, 914 N.Y.S.2d at 548–50.
266. 887 N.Y.S.2d 692 (App. Div. 2009).
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hearsay evidence regarding uncharged crimes is admissible as long as it is
relevant and not “unduly prejudicial.”267
In May 1992, Shawn X. was convicted of sodomy in the first degree,
rape in the first degree, and endangering the welfare of a child.268 Shawn
X. was sentenced to five to fifteen years in prison and was released on
parole after serving ten years.269 As part of Shawn X.’s parole conditions,
he was not permitted to have any contact with individuals under eighteen
years old without written permission from his parole officer.270
Nonetheless, Shawn X. repeatedly came into contact with a three-year-old
boy, and his parole was eventually revoked.271
After Shawn X.’s parole was revoked, the state brought a petition against
Shawn X., arguing Shawn X. was a detained sex offender requiring civil
management.272 At Shawn X.’s trial, the respondent argued that his contact
with the three-year-old boy was inadmissible hearsay evidence as the family
of the three-year-old boy never brought charges against him.273 The court,
however, disagreed and established the “unduly prejudicial” test to
determine whether certain types of hearsay evidence are admissible.274
After Shawn X., the question of whether the professional reliability
exception applies requires an analysis of the “unduly prejudicial” test.275
First, the court must ask whether experts in the relevant field traditionally
rely upon the type of evidence in question.276 Second, the court must ask
whether such evidence is more prejudicial than probative.277 In 2013, the
court carefully analyzed this two-fold test in a decision that would
significantly impact the types of evidence permissible at Article § 10
proceedings.278
4. The Court’s Holding: State v. Floyd Y.
Although the Floyd Y. decision came down in 2013, the facts of the case
date back approximately twenty years.279 In January 2001, Floyd Y. was
convicted of four counts of first-degree sexual abuse and four counts of
endangering the welfare of a child for abusing his two stepchildren.280
Almost five years later, when Floyd Y. was nearing release from prison, the
Department of Correctional Services “invoked Mental Hygiene Law § 9.27

267. Id. at 697.
268. Id. at 694.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See id. at 697.
274. See id.; see also State v. Cerrick FF., 952 N.Y.S.2d 653, 655–56 (App. Div. 2012);
State v. Mark S., 924 N.Y.S.2d 661, 665 (App. Div. 2011).
275. See Shawn X., 887 N.Y.S.2d at 696–98.
276. See id. at 697.
277. See id. at 696–98.
278. See State v. Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d 204 (N.Y. 2013).
279. Id. at 207.
280. Id. at 205–06.
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and transferred Floyd Y. to Kirby Psychiatric Center.”281 At the time,
Article § 9 was used to civilly commit dangerous sex offenders because
Article § 10 had not yet been enacted.282
On April 13, 2007—a year and four months after the Department of
Correctional Services transferred Floyd Y. to Kirby—Article § 10 was
enacted, and the state petitioned to have Floyd Y. civilly committed.283 At
trial, the State’s expert witness, Dr. Mortiere, explained that she believed
Floyd Y. suffered from pedophilia, antisocial personality disorder, and
polysubstance dependence and that the combination of these mental
illnesses made it likely Floyd Y. would reoffend.284 In addition to
interviewing Floyd Y., Dr. Mortiere based her opinion on victim affidavits,
police reports, court records, and other psychiatric professionals’
evaluations.285 Dr. Mortiere discussed Floyd Y.’s sexual abuse of his two
stepchildren, for which he was convicted, as well as seven other similar
crimes.286
Dr. Mortiere explained that, in total, Floyd Y. had sexually abused nine
individuals.287 In 1992, Floyd Y. was convicted of sexual assault for
abusing his first victim, a twenty-three-year-old woman.288 In 1994, Floyd
Y. was accused of sexually abusing a teenage girl289 and, in 1995, pled
guilty to harassing the girl’s twin sister.290 In 1996, Floyd Y. was accused,
yet acquitted, of abusing an eight-year-old family friend291 and, during that
same year, admitted to having inappropriate telephone conversations with
his seventeen-year-old sister-in-law.292 In 1998, Floyd Y. was accused but
never charged with abusing his then-girlfriend’s eight-year-old daughter,
and charges were brought, but eventually dropped, for abusing the same
woman’s fifteen-year-old daughter.293 Finally, in 2001, Floyd Y. was
convicted of abusing his two stepchildren.294 Dr. Mortiere’s testimony
about Floyd Y.’s criminal history was made without any personal
knowledge of these events, which eventually led to Floyd Y.’s appeal.295
The New York State Court of Appeals analyzed Floyd Y.’s appeal by
applying the two-part test for the admissibility of hearsay evidence under
the professional reliability exception.296 All of the evidence passed the first
part of the test because it was the type of evidence traditionally relied on by
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

Id. at 206.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 213.
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experts in the field.297 As to the second part of the test, the court concluded
that out of nine alleged sexual abuse victims, hearsay evidence regarding
four victims was admissible.298 The court reasoned that the hearsay
evidence was reliable because it was accompanied by adjudications of guilt,
and the hearsay evidence was therefore more probative than prejudicial.299
Hearsay evidence regarding Floyd Y.’s inappropriate telephone calls with
his seventeen-year-old sister-in-law was also admissible because the
respondent admitted to the abuse.300 The court held that a respondent’s
admission is indicative of reliability and is therefore also more probative
than prejudicial.301
Hearsay evidence regarding Floyd Y.’s fifteen-year-old victim, the
daughter of his ex-girlfriend, was found to be admissible because Floyd Y.
signed a parole agreement to stay away from her.302 The court clarified its
decision by noting that, although the signed parole agreement was enough
to deem it more probative than prejudicial, it did not “conclusively prove
the allegations” against Floyd Y.303
The hearsay evidence regarding the three remaining allegations, however,
was not admissible in court.304 The court held that, unlike convictions or
admissions, acquittals and uncharged crimes are “more prejudicial than
probative.”305 Thus, the 1994 accusation against Floyd Y. of abusing a
teenage girl, the 1996 accusation of abusing an eight-year-old girl, and the
1998 accusation of abusing his ex-girlfriend’s eight-year-old daughter were
inadmissible hearsay evidence.306 The court did opine, however, that, if the
State could substantiate these allegations with extrinsic evidence, they
might be found reliable and thus more probative than prejudicial.307
In determining which types of extrinsic evidence would substantiate such
hearsay evidence, the court suggested that the State require live
confrontation of the victims to determine the victims’ reliability.308
Although the Floyd Y. court recognized that Article § 10 proceedings are
civil in nature and therefore the respondent is not guaranteed the right to
confront his accusers,309 the court concluded that the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments supported its suggestion.310 The
court reasoned that, because Floyd Y.’s liberty interest, protected by the
297. See id. at 214. These offenses include Floyd Y.’s conviction of sexual assault
against a twenty-three-year-old woman in 1992, Floyd Y.’s guilty plea to harassing a teenage
girl in 1994, and Floyd Y.’s convictions for abusing his two stepchildren in 2001. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 209; see also supra Part I.B.1–2.
310. Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d at 209.
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Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, is in direct conflict with the possibility
of being civilly committed, hearsay evidence must meet a minimum
threshold of reliability.311
In addition, the Floyd Y. court cited to the Mathews v. Eldridge312
balancing test, which weighs “(1) the private interest of the litigant; (2) the
risk of erroneous deprivation in the absence of substitute procedures; and
(3) the State’s interest in avoiding additional procedures.”313 It is from this
test that the court concluded that the most reliable way to substantiate
hearsay evidence regarding “[c]riminal charges that resulted in neither
acquittal nor conviction” is to “require live confrontation of the declarant to
ensure the statement’s reliability.”314
B. The Floyd Y. Decision and the Requirements of the Law
Part II.B first examines whether the Constitution requires live
confrontation in Article § 10 proceedings. This section then explores
whether New York State’s Civil Practice Law and Rules require live
confrontation in Article § 10 proceedings. Finally, it explores whether the
legislative intent of Article § 10 supports a live confrontation requirement.
1. The Confrontation Clause and Article § 10 Proceedings
As defined in Part I.B.1 of this Note, the Confrontation Clause requires
that individuals accused of criminal offenses be able to question and cross
examine their accusers in open court.315 The Confrontation Clause,
however, is not applicable in civil proceedings.316 Therefore, the
Confrontation Clause plays no role in Article § 10 proceedings as Article
§ 10 cases are civil, not criminal.317 Even if Article § 10 cases were
criminal, however, both recent statutes and court cases suggest that live
confrontation still would not be required.318
As discussed in Part I.B.1 of this Note, the Supreme Court ruled in
Maryland v. Craig that in cases involving child victims, the accused’s right
to confrontation is not absolute.319 State legislatures have been relatively
silent when it comes to whether the accused’s right to confrontation is
absolute in cases involving adult victims of sexual assault, with the
exception of Hawaii.320 In Hawaii, a broad statute offers victims and
witnesses “the right to testify at trial by televised two-way CCTV to be
viewed by the court, the accused, and the trier of fact.”321 The justification
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id. at 212–13.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d at 210; see also Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
See Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d at 214.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004).
See id. at 42–43.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.01 (McKinney 2011).
See infra notes 320, 325–27 and accompanying text.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 849–50 (1990).
See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 801D-7 (West 2008).
Id.
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for this statute is that it promotes cooperation between victims and law
enforcement and “ensure[s] that all victims and witnesses of crimes are
treated with [the] dignity, respect, courtesy, and sensitivity” that they
deserve.322 Whether such alternatives will be available to an adult victim is
decided on a case-by-case basis.323
Although state and federal courts have also been relatively silent on the
issue of whether Craig can be extended to adult victims, some courts have
formed an opinion.324 For example, in People v. Wrotten,325 the New York
State Court of Appeals held that “[n]owhere does Craig suggest that it is
limited to child witnesses.”326 In a federal case heard by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the court held that Craig “suggest[s] a general
rule not limited to protecting child victims.”327 In fact, it is possible to read
Craig “as allowing a necessity-based exception for face-to-face, incourtroom confrontation where the witness’s inability to testify invokes the
state’s interest in protecting the witness—from trauma in child sexual abuse
cases or, as here, from physical danger or suffering” from the defendant.328
Although courts’ willingness to address the breadth of Craig is sparse,
the Fifth Circuit and the New York State Court of Appeals suggest Craig
should not be limited to cases involving child victims of sexual abuse.329
Therefore, even if Article § 10 proceedings were subject to the
Confrontation Clause, it is possible that live confrontation still would not be
required.
2. New York State’s Civil Practice Law and Rules:
The General Rule Against Hearsay
Whereas the Confrontation Clause applies only to criminal cases, Article
§ 45 of the New York State Civil Practice Law and Rules applies to all New
York State civil proceedings.330 Therefore, in all civil cases, hearsay
evidence is inadmissible unless it falls within one of New York State’s
hearsay exceptions.331 As held in Floyd Y., hearsay evidence regarding
uncharged crimes and/or dropped charges, even if it meets the first part of
322. Id. § 801D-1.
323. See id.
324. See infra notes 325–27 and accompanying text.
325. 923 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2009).
326. Id. at 1103; People v. Adams, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 512, 530 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding
that, although the court has not seen a case recognizing a legitimate state interest in
protecting adult victims of sexual assault, “revolutionary change” is taking place in society);
see also People v. Murphy, 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 688, 693–94 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that, in
an appropriate case, the court may permit an adult victim to testify via a one-way screen, but
because the trial court did not show that the victim would suffer irreparable harm from live
confrontation, the defendant’s right to confrontation was violated).
327. Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 319–20 (5th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).
328. Id. at 320.
329. See id.; Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d at 1103; see also Nat’l Crime Victim Law Inst.,
Allowing Adult Sexual Assault Victims to Testify at Trial via Live Video Technology,
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN BULL., Sept. 2011, at 1–15.
330. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 101 (MCKINNEY 2003).
331. See supra Part I.B.3.
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the professional reliability exception, is still inadmissible under the second
part of the professional reliability exception if it is more prejudicial than
probative.332
The Floyd Y. court suggested that, in order to establish the reliability of
hearsay evidence pertaining to uncharged and acquitted crimes, courts
should require live confrontation of the declarant to ensure the statements’
reliability.333 In no jurisdiction in the United States, however, is live
confrontation required in civil cases.334 Nonetheless, introducing such
hearsay that is more prejudicial than probative would violate due process
and thus require substantiation.335
As described in Part I.A.2 of this Note, twenty states and the federal
government have statutes pertaining to the civil commitment of dangerous
sex offenders.336 Most of these states not only have similar sex offender
civil commitment statutes337 but also have substantially similar rules
against hearsay.338 Further, many of these states also have similar
professional reliability exceptions,339 and all of these states are required to
abide by the due process requirements of the U.S. Constitution.340
In Massachusetts, however, the Supreme Judicial Court ruled that a
respondent suffered no prejudice when hearsay evidence regarding an
uncharged crime was introduced as evidence because the jury was presented
with such strong evidence pertaining to the respondent’s dangerousness.341
The jury was presented with the respondent’s adult and juvenile records,
which indicated that the respondent had been found guilty of two counts of
rape of a child, two counts of aggravated rape of a child, and five counts of
assault and battery of a child under fourteen years old.342 Therefore, in
cases where there is sufficient nonhearsay evidence and/or sufficiently
reliable hearsay evidence, there is no due process violation in introducing
hearsay evidence pertaining to uncharged crimes.343

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

See State v. Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d 204, 214 (N.Y. 2013).
See id.
See MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note 129, at 701.
See Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d at 214.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/1.01–205/12 (West 2008); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 123A, §§ 1–16 (LexisNexis 2003); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§§ 841.001–.007 (West 2010).
338. See, e.g., ILL. R. EVID. 802; TEX. R. EVID. 802; SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
ADVISORY COMM. ON MASS. EVIDENCE LAW, MASSACHUSETTS GUIDE TO EVIDENCE § 802
(2014 ed.).
339. See, e.g., ILL. R. EVID. 703 (stating “[i]f of a type reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data
need not be admissible in evidence”); TEX. R. EVID. 703 (same); SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
ADVISORY COMM. ON MASS. EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 338, § 703 (stating “[t]he facts or
data in the particular case upon which an expert witness bases an opinion or inference may
be those [that] are a permissible basis for an expert to consider in formulating an opinion”).
340. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
341. Commonwealth v. Connors, 850 N.E.2d 1038, 1044 (Mass. 2006).
342. Id.
343. See id.
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In In re Detention of Isbell,344 the Appellate Court of Illinois held that the
respondent suffered no prejudice when the trial court permitted an expert
witness to rely on hearsay testimony about an allegation of sexual assault a
janitor made against the respondent.345 The court held that, as long as the
expert testified that the information was used for the sole purpose of
forming his or her opinion and not for the truth of the underlying facts, the
evidence presented was more probative than prejudicial.346
Similarly, in In re Commitment of Tesson,347 the Texas Court of Appeals
permitted experts to testify about various alleged uncharged crimes against
the respondent.348 The court held that, so long as the jury was instructed
that the experts used the underlying evidence only to form their opinions
and that it was up to the jury to determine the credibility of the underlying
facts, there was no due process violation.349
The Floyd Y. court explicitly acknowledged in its decision that, in civil
cases, substantiating hearsay evidence can be accomplished in a variety of
ways.350 However, the court’s holding suggesting live confrontation failed
to acknowledge any other alternative.351 As evidenced by Massachusetts,
Illinois, and Texas, however, there are ways in which to introduce hearsay
evidence regarding uncharged crimes and/or dropped charges without
violating due process and also without unnecessarily involving the
testimony of past victims of sexual assault.352
3. Article § 10’s Legislative Intent
Floyd Y. was a novel case. The court suggested a way to substantiate
hearsay evidence deemed more prejudicial than probative:
live
confrontation.353 The laws governing civil commitment cases do not
require live confrontation.354 There is also evidence in Article § 10’s
legislative history that the legislature did not intend for victims to play a
role in such proceedings.355
For example, in the bill to enact Article § 10, the Senate proposed to
amend Criminal Procedure Law §§ 380.50(4) and (5), which set forth the
notification system available to victims of sexual assault.356 By amending
Criminal Procedure Law §§ 380.50(4) and (5), the state would be required,
if requested, to notify victims of sexual offenses, as defined under Article

344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

777 N.E.2d 994 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
Id. at 1000.
See id.
413 S.W.3d 514 (Tex. App. 2013).
Id. at 519.
See id. at 519–20.
State v. Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d 204, 212 (N.Y. 2013).
See supra notes 341, 345, 348 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 341, 345, 348 and accompanying text.
Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d at 214.
See infra notes 356, 362, 366 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 356, 362, 366 and accompanying text.
S. 3318, 230th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 7 (N.Y. 2007).
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§ 10.03(p), of a change in their abusers’ statuses.357 Such changes in status
include if/when an abuser escapes, absconds, or is released from custody.358
Further, the amendment also requires the state to notify victims of sexual
assault if/when their abusers are transferred to the custody of the Office of
Mental Health or are released from civil confinement.359
The purpose of amending this section of the Criminal Procedure Law is
to ensure that a victim is notified if there is a change in his or her abuser’s
status.360 This information might help victims implement any precautions
they feel are necessary if their abusers are released and, at minimum, inform
victims that their abusers may be out in public.361
The tendency of convicted sex offenders to secure early release dates
and/or short sentences is addressed in a letter to Governor Spitzer regarding
Article § 10.362 The New York State Psychiatric Association (NYSPA)
explains that individuals accused of sexual assault are often able to secure
short prison sentences by pleabargaining.363 The District Attorney’s Office
often engages in pleabargaining “to avoid the need for their victims, often
children, to testify in court regarding the crimes committed against
them.”364 This is the first piece of evidence in the legislative history of
Article § 10 that addresses how live confrontation affects sexual assault
victims.365 The New York City Bar expands on this piece of evidence,
explaining that Article § 10 is a response “to the public’s feeling that sex
offenses are so damaging to victims, and so frightening to potential victims,
that offenders should be sternly punished and closely watched for many
years.”366
Both the NYSPA and the New York City Bar suggest that victims of
sexual assault are not only damaged by the crimes committed against them
but might be further damaged if forced to testify in open court.367 Article
§ 10 supports this sentiment, in that psychiatric examiners are not permitted
to gain access to any identifying information of a victim without a court
order or good cause368 to ensure a victim’s privacy.369 Further, Article § 10
also ensures that a respondent will not be capable of contacting one of his
victims.370
In addition to live confrontation not being required by the laws governing
civil commitment statutes and being against the legislative intent of Article
§ 10, live confrontation is also arguably against public policy. The
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.

See id.
See id. at 23.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 64–65.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
See id. at 64–65, 98.
N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 10.08(b) (McKinney 2011).
See id.
See id.
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following part will explore the psychological impacts, both positive and
negative, that live confrontation has on victims of sexual assault.
III. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF LIVE CONFRONTATION
ON VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT
Part III begins by presenting the argument that victims may benefit by
confronting their abusers. It then presents the argument that live
confrontation is detrimental to victims of sexual assault.
A. Live Confrontation Is Psychologically Beneficial
for Victims of Sexual Assault
The court in Floyd Y. suggested that a reliable way to substantiate
hearsay evidence regarding acquittals and/or dropped charges is to “require
live confrontation of the declarant to ensure the statement’s reliability.”371
Although the Floyd Y. court did not address any arguments about the effects
of live confrontation on sexual assault victims, there are psychological
studies that suggest that, in a limited number of situations, live
confrontation may not be as harmful as expected.372
For example, in an article about the effects of disclosure and intervention
on sexually abused children, Dr. Berliner and Dr. Conte explain that live
confrontation does not always lead to more symptoms in victims of sexual
assault.373 In a study conducted on children who testified in juvenile court,
those children who testified actually showed more improvement than those
who did not.374 Only those children who had to testify more than once or
those children who were subject to long and harsh cross examination were
less likely to show improvement.375 Thus, Dr. Berliner and Dr. Conte
concluded that, in cases where a child is only required to testify once under
relatively moderate conditions, testifying in open court may not lead to
more symptoms in child victims of sexual assault.376
Dr. Berliner and Dr. Conte describe their conclusions of a case study of
two groups of child victims of sexual assault: one group who did testify in
criminal court and one group who did not.377 Many children who testified
felt that it was not as bad as they thought it would be.378 Further, some of
the children who did not testify regretted their decisions.379
Dr. Berliner and Dr. Conte’s findings are supported by an earlier study
conducted by Dr. Runyan, who concluded that, in cases which terminated
quickly in either a conviction or plea bargain, children who testified
371. State v. Floyd Y., 2 N.E.3d 204, 214 (N.Y. 2013).
372. See infra notes 373, 380, 382 and accompanying text.
373. Lucy Berliner & Jon R. Conte, The Effects of Disclosure and Intervention on
Sexually Abused Children, 19 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 371, 372 (1995).
374. Id.
375. See id. at 372–73.
376. See id.
377. See id. at 381.
378. See id.
379. See id. at 381–82.
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recovered just as fast as children who did not.380 In fact, Dr. Runyan claims
that, in such cases, children who testified recovered even faster than those
who did not testify.381
In both case studies, children who testified under moderate conditions, in
cases that were resolved relatively quickly with either a conviction or a plea
bargain, recovered just as fast as or even faster than those children who did
not testify.382 In more complicated cases, however, both studies concluded
that the psychological impact on child victims of sexual assault was very
different.383
B. Live Confrontation Is Psychologically Detrimental
for Victims of Sexual Assault
The Floyd Y. court’s suggestion to use live confrontation to substantiate
hearsay evidence was novel in Article § 10 cases; however, live
confrontation has been—and still is—used to substantiate hearsay evidence
in criminal proceedings.384 Live confrontation is often present during a
criminal proceeding because the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused
the right to confront their accusers.385 Consequently, numerous psychiatric
professionals have published articles on the psychological effects of live
confrontation on victims of crimes.386
Psychiatric professionals have predominantly focused on the impact of
live confrontation on sexually abused children.387 This is particularly
relevant in Article § 10 cases. As the legislative history of Article § 10
explains, “those referred for civil commitment should be repeat, chronic
felony sex offenders who have committed predatory crimes involving
violence, stranger victims or young children.”388
The majority of studies regarding the psychological effects of live
confrontation on sexually abused children conclude that, overall, testifying
380. See Desmond K. Runyan et al., Impact of Legal Intervention on Sexually Abused
Children, 113 J. PEDIATRICS 647, 650 (1988).
381. See id. at 651; see also Debra Whitcomb, Legal Interventions for Child Victims, 16 J.
TRAUMATIC STRESS 149, 155 (2003) (“Importantly, the research has failed to demonstrate
lasting negative effects of involvement in the justice system for most children. With time,
some children reflect positively on the experience, even while acknowledging the fears and
anxieties associated with having to testify.”).
382. See Berliner & Conte, supra note 373, at 372–82; Runyan et al., supra note 380, at
651; see also David Finkelhor & Angela Browne, The Traumatic Impact of Child Sexual
Abuse: A Conceptualization, 55 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 530, 539 (1985) (“[I]f the child
has a sense of having been able to end the abuse and obtain support and protection, this may
greatly mitigate any sense of powerlessness that resulted from the experience itself.”).
383. See Berliner & Conte, supra note 373, at 373; Runyan et al., supra note 380, at 651;
see also Finkelhor & Browne, supra note 382, at 539 (stating that if “a great many
authorities become involved in the experience and the child is forced to testify, forced to
leave home, forced to tell the story on repeated occasions, and subjected to a great deal of
unwanted attention, this can also greatly increase the child’s sense of powerlessness”).
384. See Brannon, supra note 118, at 445–46.
385. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
386. See, e.g., Brannon, supra note 118, at 446–48.
387. See id.; see also infra notes 395–96 and accompanying text.
388. See S. 3318, 230th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 61 (N.Y. 2007) (emphasis added).
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does more harm than good for victims of sexual assault.389 Not only can
testifying be stressful in court, it can also lead to numerous emotional
consequences.390 For example, children may be re exposed to feelings of
betrayal, helplessness, and powerlessness, and confronting their abusers
may bring the memories of abuse to the forefront of their minds.391
Another consequence of live confrontation is that the emotional impact
of testifying in court may stay with the child into adulthood.392 Studies
suggest that a child might develop at a slower rate “than his or her peers
because trauma during childhood can delay normal cognitive and emotional
development.”393 Testifying before one’s abuser can also lead to
“depression, anxiety, and some psychosomatic symptoms.”394
In addition to causing problems into adulthood, testifying in court may
also lead to immediate negative results.395 In a controlled study regarding
the emotional effects on child sexual assault victims, numerous psychiatric
professionals concluded that children who testified in open court
experienced more symptoms than children who did not, especially those
children who had to testify more than once.396
Although a substantial number of articles focus on the impact live
confrontation has on child victims, there are also articles addressing adult
victims.397 In her published article, Dr. Moriarty explains that, by requiring
a victim to retell his or her experience, a victim is forced to relive the
abuse.398 Reliving experiences of abuse can be extremely painful, and
“much of the criminal justice literature supports this position.”399 Dr.
Moriarty concludes that, by retelling their stories of abuse, victims in
general may suffer irreparable emotional harm.400
Dr. Moriarty’s conclusions are further supported by a study that tracked
fear reactions in rape victims for one year after the assaults.401 Dr.
Calhoun’s study aimed to determine what types of situations evoked fear in
rape victims and to what degree such fear was evoked.402 After further
investigation about how live confrontation affected rape victims, the study
concluded that victims who were required to testify in open court felt it was
389. See Brannon, supra note 118, at 439.
390. See id. at 442.
391. See id. at 442–43.
392. Id. at 445.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. See Gail S. Goodman et al., Testifying in Criminal Court: Emotional Effects on
Child Sexual Assault Victims, 57 MONOGRAPHS SOC’Y FOR RES. CHILD DEV. 1, 62 (1992).
396. See id.; see also Kathleen A. Kendall-Tackett et al., Impact of Sexual Abuse on
Children: A Review and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 164,
172–73 (1993).
397. See, e.g., Laura J. Moriarty, Victim Participation at Parole Hearings: Balancing
Victim, Offender, and Public Interest, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 385, 386 (2005).
398. See id.
399. Id.
400. See id.
401. See Karen S. Calhoun et al., A Longitudinal Examination of Fear Reactions in
Victims of Rape, 29 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 655, 656 (1982).
402. See id. at 659.
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“highly traumatic” not only because they were forced to relive their abuse
but also because their credibility and integrity were questioned and
attacked.403 Because live confrontation has the potential to evoke
debilitating fear in rape victims, the study suggests that, if a victim is forced
to testify, he or she will require extensive support from psychiatric
professionals.404
One final article regarding the impact of judicial involvement,
specifically the impact of live confrontation on victims of sexual assault,
sums up psychiatric professionals’ fears by drawing distinctions between
what a victim needs and what the court requires:
Victims need social acknowledgment and support; the court requires them
to endure a public challenge to their credibility. Victims need to establish
a sense of power and control over their lives; the court requires them to
submit to a complex set of rules and procedures that they may not
understand, and over which they have no control. Victims need an
opportunity to tell their stories in their own way, in a setting of their
choice; the court requires them to respond to a set of yes-or-no questions
that break down any personal attempt to construct a coherent and
meaningful narrative. Victims often need to control or limit their
exposure to specific reminders of the trauma; the court requires them to
relive the experience by directly confronting the perpetrator.405

By drawing distinctions between what courts offer to victims and the
psychological needs of victims, Dr. Herman attempts to show that judicial
involvement may be harmful for victims of sex crimes, further supporting
the notion that live confrontation should not be required at civil
commitment proceedings.406
IV. FINDING A BALANCE BETWEEN THE GENERAL WELFARE
OF VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AND DUE PROCESS OF THE LAW
Part IV concludes that live confrontation can be, and should be, the last
resort to substantiate hearsay evidence in the Article § 10 setting. This part
first explains that by applying already established hearsay exceptions in
New York State, live confrontation is unnecessary in Article § 10 cases. It
then suggests that, if New York State continues to require live
confrontation, it should implement video technology to reduce the
psychological impact of live confrontation on victims of sexual assault.
Finally, it concludes with suggesting various reforms in the criminal justice
system that have the ability to drastically reduce and eventually eliminate
the need for live confrontation in Article § 10 proceedings.
403. See id.
404. See id. at 661; see also Jim Parsons & Tiffany Bergin, The Impact of Criminal
Justice Involvement on Victims’ Mental Health, 23 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 182, 183 (2010).
405. Judith Lewis Herman, The Mental Health of Crime Victims: Impact of Legal
Intervention, 16 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 159, 159–60 (2003).
406. See id.; see also Mary P. Koss, Blame, Shame, and Community: Justice Responses
to Violence Against Women, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1332, 1335 (2000) (finding that
“[t]estifying is one of four significant predictors of posttraumatic stress disorder symptoms
among adult survivors of child rape”).
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A. New York State’s Hearsay Exceptions
In suggesting live confrontation as the way to substantiate hearsay
evidence pertaining to uncharged crimes and/or dropped charges, the New
York State Court of Appeals failed to address alternatives that do not
require the presence of victims of sexual assault.407 The Floyd Y. court
opined that due process required live confrontation to establish the
statements’ reliability; however, states such as Massachusetts, Illinois, and
Texas, which all have substantially similar hearsay rules and exceptions,
have, in similar cases, ensured due process without victim involvement.408
New York State should consider revising its present holding by
incorporating the holdings of one or more of these other states.409 In cases
where there is sufficient nonhearsay evidence and/or sufficient reliable
hearsay evidence, New York State could permit hearsay evidence regarding
uncharged and/or dropped crimes in Article § 10 proceedings as it is not a
violation of due process to introduce such statements when a prima facie
case has already been established.410 This would have been especially
significant in State v. Floyd Y., as the court had already introduced
admissible evidence pertaining to seven of Floyd Y.’s past crimes.411
As an alternative, New York State should consider whether an expert’s
testimony or a jury instruction that hearsay is being used for the sole
purpose of forming an expert opinion and not for the truth of the underlying
facts ensures due process.412 If these alternatives have been held to satisfy
the requirements of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in other states,
there is no reason why they would not ensure due process in New York.413
If New York refuses to adopt such holdings, courts should investigate
whether hearsay statements regarding uncharged crimes and/or dropped
charges fall within one of New York State’s hearsay exceptions before
requiring live confrontation.414 For example, the court should look to see if
any statements fall under the exception for excited utterances.415 As most
Article § 10 cases involve sexual assault, rape, and/or child abuse, there is
the possibility that a victim told someone about the abuse.416 If the court is
still concerned with the statements’ reliability, they should require the
outcry witness,417 not the victim, to come in and testify in order to ensure
the statements’ reliability.
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Similarly, because most Article § 10 cases involve sexual assault, rape,
and/or child abuse, there is the possibility that a victim sought professional
help.418 In such cases, statements regarding uncharged crimes and/or
dropped charges discussed during treatment should be admitted under the
hearsay exception for statements made for medical treatment or
diagnosis.419 If the court wishes to evaluate the statements’ reliability, they
have the option of subpoenaing the treating physician and sparing a victim
of sexual assault the hardship of testifying in open court.420
Lastly, the court should consider interpreting the hearsay exception for
when a party causes the declarant’s unavailability more broadly in the
Article § 10 setting.421 Various criminal courts have held that, when a
victim feels pressure not to testify in front of his or her abuser, hearsay
evidence may be admitted under this exception.422 For example, in People
v. Byrd, the court held that a victim’s out-of-court statements were
permissible under the hearsay exception for when a party causes the
declarant’s unavailability because the victim suffered from battered person
syndrome resulting from years of physical and emotional abuse.423 Further,
in People v. Jernigan, the court held that a victim’s out-of-court statements
were permissible under the same exception because the victim would feel
pressure not to testify as a result of being in a prior abusive relationship.424
It can be plausibly argued that a victim of sexual assault would feel
tremendous pressure not to testify in front of his or her abuser.425 Because
most civil commitment proceedings take place decades after the abuse,
requiring a victim to testify may bring back memories that the victim has
done his or her best to put out of his or her mind.426 Such revictimization
may be too much to bear for a victim of sexual assault and can easily be
attributed to the abuser’s actions.427
B. Implementation of Video Technology
If New York State continues to require live confrontation to substantiate
hearsay evidence regarding uncharged crimes and/or dropped charges, the
court should consider utilizing video technology to reduce the detrimental
effects of live confrontation on victims of sexual assault.428 As held
constitutional by Maryland v. Craig, courts are permitted to implement
alternative procedures if the state can adequately show that such procedures
would protect a child from the trauma of testifying in open court.429 There
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is no reason why the same rule should not apply to sex offender civil
commitment proceedings, regardless of the victim’s age.430
Article § 10 proceedings are unique in that they often occur decades after
crimes take place and target repeat, chronic sex offenders who prey on child
victims.431 Therefore, although many victims were children at the time of
the abuse, they are grown by the time civil commitment proceedings begin
and are therefore not afforded the “special procedure[s]” upheld by
Craig.432
By expanding Craig’s holding to sex offender civil commitment
proceedings, the court would spare victims of sexual assault unnecessary
trauma from testifying in court.433 As explained in Part III.B of this Note,
testifying in court can force a victim to relive the abuse by recalling horrific
details of rape and/or sexual assault.434 Testifying in court may also lead to
irreparable harm such as depression, anxiety, and uncontrollable fear.435
There is nothing in the Craig decision that implies it should be limited to
children.436 Further, as Article § 10 decisions are civil, not criminal, there
is no constitutional argument that a respondent in a civil commitment
proceeding has the right to confront his accuser.437 The only evidentiary
concern in an Article § 10 proceeding would be the admissibility of
unreliable hearsay evidence, which, through one-way CCTV, two-way
CCTV, or videotaped depositions, could be evaluated by the court.
C. Changes in the Criminal Justice System
Finding a way to introduce hearsay evidence through an exception to the
hearsay rule, or permitting victims to testify through video technology are
two alternatives aimed to reduce the need for live confrontation in civil
commitment proceedings. There are reforms, however, within the criminal
justice system, which may one day eliminate the need for live confrontation
in civil commitment hearings.
One option the legislature should consider is reforming sentencing
guidelines for violent sex offenders. Instead of presenting evidence that a
sex offender suffers from a mental abnormality at a civil commitment
hearing, such evidence could be presented at the criminal trial. Evidence
pertaining to mental abnormality and dangerousness could then be
considered at the sentencing phase of the trial, thus eliminating the need for
civil commitment proceedings entirely.
The most important change that could—and should—be implemented in
the criminal justice system pertains to the documentation of accusations of
sexual assault. It is vital that the District Attorney’s Office takes all
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accusations of sexual assault seriously, documenting all testimony and
evidence in thorough detail. Even if the District Attorney does not believe
that a case can move forward because of a lack of corroborating evidence,
he or she still should take whatever steps necessary to document the
declarant’s accusations.
The District Attorney may choose to depose the declarant on video, so
that if the accused is one day petitioned for civil commitment, such video
testimony can be admitted at trial. The same course of action could be
implemented in a case where charges are brought but the accused is
acquitted. Although implementing these measures may seem unnecessary
at the time, the small effort and cost it would require is well worth the
spared suffering down the road.
CONCLUSION
In New York State civil commitment hearings, hearsay evidence
regarding uncharged crimes and/or dropped charges is inadmissible in
court. In State v. Floyd Y., the New York State Court of Appeals held that
hearsay evidence regarding uncharged crimes and/or dropped charges could
be found to be reliable if the declarant testifies in open court. The court’s
suggestion to require live confrontation in these cases subjects victims of
sexual assault to unnecessary, irreparable harm. The court may implement
various alternatives, such as utilizing the widely recognized exceptions to
the general rule against hearsay, utilizing video technology, and promoting
significant changes in the criminal justice system, to reduce and eventually
eliminate the need for live confrontation. Each of these alternatives would
satisfy due process while sparing victims of violent sexual assaults the
trauma of testifying in open court.

